For my final blog post, I finally caved and wrote a whimsical title. That aside, my thoughts today focus on budgetary logrolling and its instrumentality as both a strategic weapon and as an electoral tool. Congress now is engaged in two intense, simultaneous end-of-year appropriations battles. Funding for the war presents severe logistical and partisan problems, as the President has requested approval for $196 billion dollars in short-term funding, while Democrats entered the conversation vowing to block any funding whatsoever unless accompanied by strict legislative timelines for withdrawal from the theater. At the same time, Democrats are attempting to launch a significant increase in funding for domestic programs (initially $22 billion), which Senate Republicans have violently opposed, at the President's emphatic urging.
The Democrats face a complex negotiating position. They require cooperation from Senate Republicans and from the President to pass their hoped-for domestic appropriations bills. Democratic increasing acquiescence to Republican demands on the war-funding front is understandable as part of a traditional log-rolling calculus: they need to realize part of the aggressive domestic agenda on which they won their historic victories in the midterm elections in order to hope for success in the 2008 cycle. They also cannot reasonably hold the line on their "no funding for the war" position without suffering immense electoral fallout.
The Republicans, however, face an equally complicated electoral picture, as a significant element of the Republican plan to recoup from their sweeping defeats in 2006 is to return the party to its small-government, low-spending Reaganite roots after the really incredible increase in federal spending overseen by President Bush, whose unprecedentedly low approval ratings form a constant specter in Republican planning for the 2008 election.
Neither party, in consequence, can play a traditional multi-player logrolling game, where concession can be traded for concession. Each dollar the Democrats lose in domestic spending further belies the very ambitious public goals advertised during the 2006 midterms, and each dollar they vote to the war without demanding withdrawal timelines weakens their ability to run as the non-Iraq-war party. Each dollar the Republicans accept in domestic spending decreases their ability to execute the reposition on the spending spectrum they hope to accomplish, and any concession made on withdrawal deadlines or decreased troop funding weakens their position as the party of victory against terrorism.
This all coheres into a grim picture of how Congress will resolve its spending problems. It's unlikely that a "Contract with America" shutdown is in the offing, but at the very least the Hill will emerge from this contentious debate even more stratified on party lines and even less in touch with the general tenor of the electorate, the consequences of which will certainly emerge in the coming year as the presidential election picks up speed.