Mueller
Chapter Five presents cycling theory’s revolving-door hypothesis in two-party elections. Assuming multi-dimensional issue space, challengers
can adopt different, more popular platforms than incumbents, so that “cycling
in a two-party system should appear as the incumbent’s continual defeat" (234). Mueller then rebuffs the theory by revealing
how incumbent governors win 3/4ths of re-elections and challenging parties
never win as much as 40% of elections in any decade. Consequently, Mueller dubs Tullock’s pondering
about two-party elections, “Why so much stability?” as appropriate (236).
Alan
Abramowitz’s article offers a revealing model of voting behavior that
helps explain the revolving-door hypothesis’s inefficacy. Abramowitz’s Electoral Barometer formula has
predicted the popular vote in 14 of 15 presidential elections since WWII
combining “three indicators of the national political climate…the incumbent
president’s approval rating at mid-year, the second quarter growth rate of the economy,
and the length of time the president’s party has held the White House.” The formula reads: EB=NAR + (5*Economic
Growth) including a subtraction of 25 when the incumbent party has held office for
two or more terms, with positive and negative scores predicting victory and
defeat in the popular vote respectively. Unlike the revolving-door hypothesis, which suggests challengers readily
defeat incumbents in two-party systems from spatial mobility, Abramowitz
contests that these three reliable indicators of the national political climate
are better determinants of election results. In fact, he does not factor incumbency disadvantage into his barometer
until the incumbent party has held two terms. Although presidential elections fluctuate somewhat more than gubernatorial
contests, with 6 Democratic victories since WWII and 9 Republican, Abramowitz’s
formula offers explanation for Tullock’s question about stability. Whatever their platform, opposing parties
will have trouble securing victory if an incumbent is popular, the economy is
growing strongly and only consecutive terms create distaste for an
incumbency. Moreover, the unpredictable booms
and busts of an economy lessen the significance of revolving-door platform
change if an independent variable like economic growth strongly influences
voting behavior.
Interestingly,
the barometer read -63 in late May due to the slow 1st quarter growth
of the economy, Bush’s low approval rating, and two-terms of a Republican
president. If McCain were to overcome
this “triple whammy,” it would be “an upset of unprecedented magnitude.” Yet, McCain is the first non-incumbent president
or vice president to run in over 50 years, and Obama is the first African-American
presidential nominee in our history. If
two-party voters “are likely to view personality, or technical competence, or
some other nonideological factor as decisive” (127) like Downs' Chapter 8 suggests,
then perhaps McCain’s bipartisan image and experience, and unquantifiable racism
against Obama will make both the revolving door hypothesis and the Electoral
Barometer’s predictions for non-incumbent victory false.